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Abstract
Common-mode failures have thus far been considerably over-
looked in reliability studies. By their definition, common-mode
failures correlate heavily, breaking the assumption of probabilistic
independence. This article describes how monitoring a live, large-
scale network infrastructure provides a realistic environment for
analyzing common-mode failures, while also introducing new prob-
lems not immediately obvious in analytical or simulation studies.
Administrators perform changes to a system whenever new require-
ments, research projects, or unplanned failures manifest. To dis-
tinguish changes from failures, the process from network discovery
to service monitoring must be streamlined and enabled to handle
extremely diverse installations.
1 Introduction
Common-mode failures (CMFs) orM-plex faults have been known to com-
puter scientists since the 19th century, from the days of Babbage and his
Calculating Engine [1]. The standard method of tolerating faults is by
adding redundancy. Redundancy may be applied in either time, hard-
ware, or software by performing more calculations than required. What
makes CMFs so interesting is that by their definition, these faults mani-
fest as failures in more than one repetition. This property breaks many
previous failure models.
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Despite our knowledge of CMFs, assumptions of independent and iden-
tically distributed failures continue to surface in academia. Simultane-
ously, reports from hardware enthusiasts [2, 3, 4] show an alarming num-
ber of faults affecting entire series of products. It seems logical that global
processes have not made CMFs any scarcer than in the early days of com-
putation, when computer machinery was uniquely built and maintained
by local engineers.
As the methodology and bias of web site reporters is sometimes ques-
tionable, an initiative has begun to collect a scientific and open database
of hardware failures [5]. A recent line of work by Schroeder et al. [6, 7]
explores the field of empirical system reliability [8], within which this ar-
ticle belongs. Studies in the field are categorized by their methodology:
measuring real-world systems’ failure properties and occurrence, and then
adapting new models to fit the data. These methods are hardly new, but
the magnitude and dynamism of the observed systems are.
Current distributed systems and peer-to-peer networks are becoming
increasingly heterogeneous or diverse. Diversity has been proposed as a
possible cure for software-based CMFs [1]. Instead of repeating the calcu-
lations on (almost) identical components, the principle of design diversity
advocates introducing heterogeneity to the system on purpose.
To complement previous studies, here the viewpoint is precisely on the
diversity of the test subjects. In order to capture the states of a real-world
environment, we have built a measurement framework on top of the Na-
gios sentinel service1. In this initial phase the goal is to seek the ratio of
CMFs to independent failures. In later phases the measurement frame-
work will be continously adapted to better distinguish possible causes of
encountered failures. The hypothesis is that common-mode failures are as
common as independent failures. Furthermore, we begin to formulate a
conjecture that diversity is beneficial to the fault tolerance of distributed
systems, but perhaps harmful for their maintainability.
Common-mode failures and the problem statement are formulated in
Section 2. Section 3 describes a framework designed to measure CMFs in
a real-world environment, along with the framework’s subsystems under
construction. Section 4 describes new difficulties encountered along with
possible solutions. Section 5 concludes the contributions of this article.
1Available from http://www.nagios.com
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2 Common-mode failures
Fault-tolerance in distributed systems and peer-to-peer networks is nor-
mally attained by adding redundancy to the system. Avizˇienis and Kelly [1]
divide redundancy into the three domains of time or repetitions, space or
hardware, and program or software. The textbook definition by Tanen-
baum and van Steen [10] differs with regards to the domains: their def-
inition divides information, time, and physical redundancies. In both
definitions, redundancy can be applied in different measures to multi-
ple domains, meaning that a general XT/Y H/ZS fault-tolerant system
could perform X − 1 redundant calculations in time, on Y − 1 hardware
components, with Z − 1 program codes.
Regardless of what the actual domains are, the definition of common-
mode failures remains the same. A single common-mode failure can man-
ifest in multiple redundant repetitions or replicas. This ability can negate
the benefits of redudancy altogether, provided that the replicas are sim-
ilar. Similarity in time manifests naturally as the extra calculations are
executed by the same program code. Similarity in software or hardware
means that the redundant replicas are either copies of the same software,
or hardware devices carrying similar (potential) defects. Schroeder et al.
have defined similarity in this contect more formally as the autocorrela-
tion [6] of failure events. Roughly, a single component failure with a high
autocorrelation factor sharply increases the probability of similar compo-
nents failing in the near future. This probability then diminishes with
time.
Presently, common-mode hardware and software failures are reported
by the media as failures of entire model series of hardware or software
components [2, 3, 4]. These reports show that autocorrelated failures do
occur, but they are still rare enough to warrant attention from the media.
On the other hand, ”classical” or independent failures have become so
well-known that they receive attention only in the most severe of cases.
Thus, the research questions that we have set to figure out are as follows
1. What is the proportion of CMFs to independent failures?
2. What types of CMFs are most common?
The first question stems from the hypothesis that current real-world
systems are more vulnerable to CMFs than predicted. The rationale be-
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hind this is that a homogeneous environment seems to be easier to main-
tain than a highly diverse or heterogeneous one. Additionally, subjec-
tive factors seem to gravitate real-world systems towards homogeneity. It
is common for system administrators to possess intuitive arguments like
”machines from vendor A are better than those of vendor B” or ”systems
from vendor C should be avoided because they are so unreliable”.
The second question explores the possibility that CMFs may result
more naturally either in software or hardware environments. CMFs in
software may be the result of vulnerabilities or flaws in the program code
and thereof resulting updates or upgrades. In hardware devices, CMFs
may be the result of common manufacturing, shipping, handling, or ad-
ministration practices.
Ultimately, the purpose of the ongoing research is to prove the con-
jecture that diversity is beneficial to the fault-tolerance of distributed
systems and peer-to-peer networks. In this context, diversity is defined as
the intentional introduction of heterogeneity to a given environment. The
main drawback is that diversity is notoriously difficult to formally model
or express in simulations. Hence, we turn our attention to a real-world
environment, and describe its benchmarking in the next section.
3 The Nagios sentinel service
The Nagios measurement framework or is a robust and mature combina-
tion of checks to be run against services and the core logic that handles
check intervals and interleaving. As a sentinel service, Nagios is able
to function as the operative component of self-healing systems [11]. For
this work, the initial interest is on Nagios’ error-detection and -reporting
capabilities only. However, all experience gathered thus far seems to sup-
port the idea that administrators commonly perform similar investigative
and restorative tasks. Assuming proper authentication and authorization,
some of these tasks could well be delegated to an automated system.
In contrast to laboratory models, the object we are monitoring is
the Computer Science Department’s environment of infrastructure and
research services. This means that the set of services is highly hetero-
geneous, employing both long-lasting and critical services, like e-mail
and NFS, but also experimental and transient projects used by a few
researchers only.
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Along with those network services which are more or less always avail-
able, we are also interested in transient services that are online for the
duration of a single project only. Conversely to network services, hardware
components usually have no monitors to be read remotely. For monitor-
ing components like CPU temperatures, PSU voltages, or fan rotation
speeds, we employ a distributed daemon running in the local operating
systems. The following subsections describe a new tool designed for the
discovery of transient network services and the distribution of checks for
services without a network component. Finally, service dependencies are
explained as a concept orthogonal to but closely resembling CMFs.
3.1 Mapping with Nmap
The basic idea of using network mapping with Nagios is simple. Any local
subnets are scanned through with a well-behaving network discovery tool,
e.g., Nmap 2, and the output is then processed into Nagios’ configuration
files. Any changes occurring in the environment cause Nagios’ configura-
tion to slowly become outdated or stale. After the configuration becomes
too stale, another scan is performed and the processed configuration files
replaced. Currently, we try to scan every three to six months. At the
end of each cycle, around 20-50 services have simply disappeared or been
reassigned to different hosts.
Automatic discovery of network services and their configuration on
Nagios is an old concept, and it has been implemented in multiple ad-
dons. Conversely, Nagios’ core FAQ list makes a remark that actively
discourages automatic discovery of services [12]. The reason why we have
both embraced automatic discovery despite the official view and built yet
another tool for this purpose is two-fold.
First, along with services, network administrators themselves come
and go. In a recent anecdote, a long-term administrator rediscovered a
physical server he had set up a year ago for a specific task which had
but recently become active. Specially with robust installations, it is not
uncommon for a service to become interesting only after it has experi-
enced a (partial) failure. While doing automatic discovery, we have found
services which nobody had missed – yet. Our rationale is that it is bet-
ter to discover too many services and then reduce the monitored set to a
2Available from http://nmap.org
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reasonable size, than to try and fail to assemble a complete list.
Second, we did perform an extensive search for existing open source
utilities built for the matter at hand. Specifically the Nmap2Nagios
and Nmap2Nagios-ng projects were very useful at first. Unfortunately,
Nmap2Nagios has not been developed in seven years. Nmap2Nagios-ng3,
the successor, has been updated more recently, but the program comments
were also rewritten in German. For small changes, the language barrier
was surmountable, but when more extensive changes became necessary it
became easier to just do a complete rewrite.
For the above reasons, we have now released the Nmap3Nagios tool.
For more information, please visit the project web page4. Nmap3Nagios
is intended to become the first tool in a new toolkit designed primarily
to monitor diverse environments. The next utility under development is
a visualization aid that transforms Nagios’ archived log files into input
presentable by the Timeline widget5.
3.2 Monitoring local devices
In difference to the already released tool, the implementation of local
device monitoring is still undergoing testing. Nagios provides at least
three major alternatives for doing local checks. In order of increasing
complexity, the alternatives are the check-by-ssh plugin and the addons
NRPE and NSCA. For more information, please see the manual entry on
distributed monitoring [13]. Trying to anticipate requirements that will
appear later on, we have chosen NSCA as the distributed component.
Authorization issues are perhaps the essential difficulty of distributed
monitoring. Accessing local devices administration interfaces does require
quite low-level privileges on our current operating systems. This means
that the distributed component must be carefully given the right privileges
and preferrably none but them. These requirements might be conflicting
when, for example, monitoring local hard drives S.M.A.R.T. reports is
only possible with root-level access to the device, but that access also
enables writing to any file system block.
The benefit of using NSCA is that it does not require input from the
3-ng probably stands for ”next generation”.
4Nmap3Nagios Home: http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/pervila/Nmap3Nagios/
5Timeline widget: http://www.simile-widgets.org/timeline/
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Figure 1: Distributed monitoring of local components. Conversely with
network services, local components are checked by a locally-running Na-
gios instance. Output is encrypted and sent through the network to a
corresponding NSCA daemon, which communicates with the core Nagios
process through the external command file.
central Nagios server. Communication flows from the clients to the cen-
tral server, which makes restricting unwanted access significantly easier.
In addition, all communication is encrypted with standard, SSL-based
cryptography libraries. Figure 1 visualizes the communication process.
A common enough question concerns why local monitoring performed
by an elaborate distributed setup are preferrable over the standard solu-
tion of using SNMP. The reason for this is that not all devices have SNMP
components; using local checks enables the monitoring daemon to run any
program code available. This is a considerable advantage, for some server
equipment can only be monitored through proprietary software utilities.
3.3 Service dependencies
A vaguely related and quite similar concept to CMFs can be found in
Nagios’ software and hardware dependencies. Intuitively, it is easy to un-
derstand service dependencies through the example of switches. Server en-
vironments are usually built in hierarchical star-shaped topologies where
multiple host computers are connected to a hardware switch, and the
switches are then interconnected through a spanning-tree protocol (STP).
If the Nagios monitoring daemon now recides on a host connected to
switch A and some services are served by a host connected to switch B,
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each service is defined as dependent on both6 switch B and switch A.
This means that failures encountered in either switch will result in the
dependent services’ state being marked as unknown, not as having failed.
Simply put, nothing more can then be known about the services, because
another failure makes more thorough checking impossible.
Without this feature, it would be quite impossible for Nagios to dis-
tinguish CMFs from independent failures causing communication loss to
a set of services. The main difference to CMFs is exactly this uncertain-
ity: as the service state can not be known, we have chosen to err on the
side of caution and ignore failures possibly masked by dependency fail-
ures. As infrastructure malfunctions are luckily quite rare, there remains
a possibility of investigating these events case-by-case, perhaps adding
discovered causes to the results manually.
With only 19 switches in the department network, our dependency
graph is still of a manageable size. Keeping scalability in mind, this is an
area where further research will most certainly be necessary. Tools that
can form a topology from network addresses do exist, and will be needed
if the network size grows. However, there are still more pressing issues in
the work queue.
4 Ongoing problems
Hardly any research project finishes without discovering additional prob-
lems to be solved. Some of the issues described in this section were ac-
curately predicted at the very beginning of the project. For example, the
user interface issues described below have been well-known for quite a
while, and multiple addon packages have tried to incorporate enhance-
ments. Others, like the reconfiguration problem of booting multiple oper-
ating systems, exist on the boundary of what is feasible to monitor using
Nagios. Finally, some problems were simply excluded by limiting the ob-
served set of services. Monitoring the department’s set of laptops was one
of these, for even though a distributed monitoring setup using VPN might
have been possible, the potential for false positives was judged too high.
6Nota bene: service-to-host dependencies are implicitly handled by the core logic.
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4.1 Planning and communication
Perhaps the major problem in the measurement setup stems, unsurpris-
ingly, from the human component. It is easy to understand that any
administrator loathes redundancy in her workload, for it is vexing to up-
keep the same configuration in different places. There are limits to how
much paperwork any worker can be expected to reasonably fulfill. It is
possible that with issue tracking, e-mail correspondence, the monitoring
setup, and finally, making the actual changes, we are approaching the
limit of an administrator’s patience.
We have tried to reduce the amount of configuration tasks by taking
the burden of maintaining Nagios from the administrators. This means
that one of the researchers has worked part-time for the benefit of the
IT team and implemented the monitoring framework on behalf of them.
This solution seems to have worked reasonably well. The benefit is that
by integrating closely with the IT staff, the measurements are done with
a much better background knowledge of IT processes.
On the other hand, the integration is not perfect. There is always a
small delay between noticing a failure report and then investigating what
the root cause is. In many of the cases, the cause is a failure-preventive
task executed by one of the administrators. These effects are difficult to
completely classify as either service failures or just glitches with the mea-
surement system. The current solution is to mark all reports consistently
as failures, on the basis of the assumption that both independent and
CMFs are then similarly measured. Any additional information received
from the IT staff is also recorded case-by-case. The final output data will
contain both the measurements and background reports investigated.
As a more long-lasting solution, we are constantly evaluating Nagios
user interface addons. The idea in this is that a more tempting GUI would
make it easier to receive input directly from the administrators.
4.2 User interface issues
Not all service failures do ever get repaired. For some events, the fix
may be performed by moving the service to another host, merging the
service with another existing service, creating a new service, or simply
removing the old service altogether. In these cases, the failure is usually
acknowledged and/or further notifications surpressed. If manual pruning
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is not regularly performed, the number of these obsolete services can make
distinguishing new failures difficult.
Unfortunately, the core Nagios web GUI does not contain any recon-
figuration features. An extensive number of GUI addons have been re-
leased, and we have evaluated almost every one of them7. For a partially
complete listing, see [4]. With the exception of the Centreon8 project,
most of the addons have a very similar binding problem. Typically, each
addon incorporates the core Nagios’ reporting features and adds gener-
ative configuration facilities. This means that a new GUI can be used
to define templates and individual services, and once their configuration
is complete, the entire configuration is output and Nagios’ core daemon
restarted. The binding problem revolves around this duality of report-
ing and configuration, as the reporting interface has been left as is. This
means that when a failure has been reported, an administrator can view
the problem report from the reporting interface, but must look for and
reconfigure the service from a separate interface. This flaw seems trivial
to begin with, but causes a severe hindrance in practice.
Very recently, two projects with novel approaches for the GUI have
been announced. One of them is the NINJA project9 written by a group
of dedicated software developers. Another is the upcoming Nagios XI10
release offered by a team closely related to Nagios’ core. As of writing,
these two are the projects that we have least experience with, but are
working on testing both as soon as possible. The main hindrance to
evaluating GUI addons is their configuration complexity. Centreon is
a prime example of this, as the software is primarily sold as a support
service.
4.3 Delicate instrument
For the analysis of results, Nagios is a demanding system. The reason
for this is that Nagios’ check plugins can be very delicate. Even with
reasonable definitions of failures, e.g., at least five-minute downtimes, Na-
gios can collect a surprising amount of data. Failures normally invisible
to both users and administrators surface regularly, specially those that
7As of writing, many of the open source projects have long since been abandoned.
8Centreon: http://en.doc.centreon.com/Main_Page
9NINJA: http://www.op5.org/community/projects/ninja
10Nagios XI: http://library.nagios.com/library/products/nagiosxi/
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occur during the hours of least usage. For example, backup schedules and
automated software upgrades may give cause for a service to be taken
oﬄine for a few minutes in the small hours of the night.
Typically, users are blissfully ignorant of these service windows, while
Nagios remains ever vigilant. The downtime is a problem only in the sense
that failure severity depends only indirectly on daytime, while Nagios
approach is somewhat based on it. Also, some of our researchers and
students keep working hours which might be classified as odd. Therefore,
we have eschewed silencing failure notifications based on classical working
hours, at the cost of suffering a somewhat more chatty monitoring setup.
4.4 Reconfiguration
Currently, the most difficult problem to solve remains the automatical
reconfiguration of monitored services at run-time. More specifically, the
problem occurs in at least two very different cases. It is encountered in
workstations with multiple operating systems (OSs), and it is also encoun-
tered with network devices able to reconfigure pathways when necessary.
For multiple OSs, reconfiguration must be done when a different OS is
rebooted. Each of the department’s workstations runs a local distribution
of Linux as the default operating system. Additionally, a significant num-
ber of workstations is also installed with Microsoft Windows XP. In our
classroom configuration, any student is able to change the OS at the start
of her session. This freedom of choice requires the distributed component
of Nagios to be configured twice: once for each OS. Our prototype versions
of NSCA are based on the default Linux configuration. For Windows, the
system is somewhat more complex as the NSCA component is not exactly
the same program. We are trying to make the change transparent to the
central Nagios service, so that reconfiguration would be necessary only at
the client end. This would enable the central Nagios to reuse the same
service and host names, bypassing reloads of the central configuration.
Using a spanning-tree protocol (STP) for network switches is more or
less the de facto standard for any larger ethernet segment. STP provides a
major benefit as the switches are able to renegotiate alternative pathways
should an interconnected link fail. But STP also causes difficulties for
any services depending on the switch pathways, i.e., all services not on
the same host as the central Nagios itself.
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As of writing, no solution for STP reconfiguration has been found. In
theory, the reconfiguration step should be based on an informed topol-
ogy change, which would seem to require getting information from the
switches. This means that configuring the initial network dependencies
and STP reconfiguration should optimally be processed by the same util-
ity. The proprietary nature of the hardware devices make this less than
trivial, but the problem is somewhat mitigated by its rarity. Currently,
the network dependencies are based on the default interconnections, and
changes to the topology are resolved manually.
5 Conclusion
Despite the number of problems encountered, and that this article de-
scribes a measurement project in its early phases of implementation, the
research questions presented seem feasible to answer. The failure moni-
toring service that we have devised is clearly not a fire-and-forget solution,
but one that requires constant nurturing. This effect seems to be in line
with the predicted difficulty of administering truly diverse environments,
however, and not a fault of the Nagios sentinel service.
At this point, common-mode failures seem very much real and not
just an academic exercise. Later publications will present measurement
results attained, along with the actual data for further analysis. Even
though many of the details are in flux, and not many conclusions have
yet been made, research in this field seems both inspiring and necessary
for the well-being of computer systems and networks to come.
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